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Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of macro-institutional and macro-non-
institutional factors on the new venture creation time across emerging as well as developed 
economies in Europe using panel data from 2003 to 2006 in 15 emerging and developed 
countries. This paper finds significant relationships between the venture start-up time and 
institutional factors that include lending interest rates, start-up procedures, and taxation and one 
non-institutional factor, GDP per capita. Additionally, we found differences in the factors 
between emerging and developed countries. Institutional factors, such as start-up procedures and 
trade opportunities, are important determinants of new venture creation time in emerging 
countries, consistent with the findings of recent studies. To encourage business formation, policy 
makers may need to revise policies concerning these factors which can facilitate or restrict new 
venture formation. Implications for further research and practice are discussed. 
An earlier version of this paper has been accepted and presented at the Kauffman International 
Research and Policy Roundtable 2012, Liverpool, United Kingdom. 
 
Article: 
 
Introduction 
The importance of entrepreneurship and the successful launch and sustainability of new ventures 
for a dynamic market economy and its relation to economic growth have been well documented 
in previous research (Klapper et al.2006; Martin et al. 2010). There are variations in entry of new 
firms from country to country that impact entrepreneurial activities (Djankov et al. 2002). For 
example, a Slovenian entrepreneur in 2006 spends 60 days to complete nine required business 
start-up procedures to form a firm. In France, the launch time before operating legally is at least 
7 days and includes seven start-up procedures to be completed (World Bank Indicator, 2008). 
Furthermore, venture creation time and the number of start-up procedures required to acquire the 
necessary permits varies significantly over time. While the relationship between the time period 
before the start-up of a new business, which can be an indicator of the level of entry barriers, and 
a country’s macro-economic policies, has been discussed in the literature extensively, there has 
been little, if any, research that has examined this phenomena. Over the last decade, Europe has 
witnessed significant changes, particularly concerning fiscal and monetary policies, especially 
with the latest debt crisis in Greece and other countries, including Spain, Italy, and Ireland (Gali 
and Perotti 2003; Schuknecht et al. 2010). The focus of our study is to determine the time-
varying macro-institutional factors (taxation, procedures to register a business, lending interest 
rates, inflation, and bank credit) and macro-non-institutional factors (unemployment levels, trade 
levels (import/export, GDP per capita, and education levels) that may facilitate entrepreneurship 
or create entry barriers for nascent entrepreneurs through extending the time period required to 
start up a new venture. 
New venture start-up remains a challenge for entrepreneurs because it requires a substantial 
amount of personal perseverance and commitment (Busenitz and Lau 1996; Gatewood et 
al. 1995; Markman et al. 2002). The degree of challenge is further elevated in unfriendly 
institutional environments, which particularly exhibit a relatively longer time period to start up a 
new business (Bowen and Dirk 2008). Indeed, an excessively long time lag between the 
initiation of venture preparation and actual start-up can be discouraging for some prospective 
entrepreneurs by keeping them from starting up or leading some to operate in informal (i.e., 
unregistered) sectors. The informal economy has become such a major factor in worldwide 
economic growth that it was the theme of the 2012 Academy of Management Conference, an 
organization with 18,000 scholars worldwide. 
This paper comprehensively investigates the factors that can hinder the formation of new 
businesses in European economies through extending the waiting time to start up a business. 
Minimizing the barriers to entry can encourage entrepreneurs to enter into the markets and a 
higher number of entrants can enhance the standard of living through economic growth (Djankov 
et al. 2002). Accordingly, entrepreneurship researchers suggest that certain economic, political, 
and institutional settings, which are objective and community-specific, can be more conducive to 
entrepreneurship (Minniti and Bygrave 1999; Minniti 2004). In addition, entrepreneurship is a 
self-reinforcing phenomenon since entrepreneurial endeavors also depend on the existing level of 
entrepreneurial activity (Minniti and Bygrave 1999). Accordingly, entrepreneurship can lead to 
more entrepreneurship (Bygrave and Minniti 2000). Therefore, it is important for policy makers 
to create munificent environments for prospective entrepreneurs. 
Previous studies (e.g., Walker and Brown 2004) mostly highlighted the importance of financial 
criteria to start up new businesses, but only a handful of studies (De Soto 1990; Klapper et 
al. 2006; Klapper et al. 2008) raised concerns about how various regulations can affect firm 
formation. We still do not know enough about the impact of regulations on new venture 
formation. 
We provide a more comprehensive look at these phenomena by examining cross-country data to 
fill the gaps in the extant economic as well as entrepreneurship literature. Specifically, we 
examine the impact of macro-institutional and macro-non-institutional factors on new venture 
creation time across 15 emerging as well as developed economies in Europe. We use cross-
country panel data from the World Bank (2008) data set from 2003–2006. This data set was 
recently published to address the important question of whether institutional, non-institutional, or 
both factors affect firm birth rates. Recently, there has been a call for entrepreneurship studies 
drawing upon institutional theory and investigating multiple countries by Bruton et al. (2010). 
The authors point out that, to date, studies mostly focus on individual countries or examine a few 
countries in the entrepreneurship field. In order to enhance the generalizability of the findings, 
we extend this line of research to include 15 countries longitudinally from 2003 to 2006. 
This paper finds significant relationships between the venture start-up time and institutional 
factors such as lending interest rates, start-up procedures, and taxation as well as GDP per capita 
as a non-institutional factor. The results of this study can inform scholars, policy makers, and 
practitioners about how a country’s institutional or non-institutional factors may block firm 
formation by extending waiting time to start up a new business which consequently may retard 
economic growth. Therefore, our study can guide policy makers to provide better new venture 
friendly institutional mechanisms that can facilitate business formation through diminishing the 
number of days required to start up a new business thereby encouraging new venture start-up. 
This study is particularly useful for the 15 countries included in the study to examine the effect 
of their policies and make needed changes. Indeed, the examination of institutional and 
environmental factors can be particularly useful for public policy making decisions since they 
can be more sensitive to policy reforms, whereas individual-level factors may require more time 
to be influenced by public policy (Acs et al. 2008). 
Our paper will proceed as follows. We will provide an introduction and theoretical overview. 
Next, we present the methodology and results. We also provide a discussion, future research 
directions, and implications for public policy. 
 
Theoretical overview 
Gebremariam et al. (2006) suggest that a country needs to have sound policies which encourage 
new venture creation. This, in return, can strengthen and diversify the local economy. Policies 
and economic environments may be substantially different across countries (Reynolds 1994; 
Fritsch 1994; Johnson and Parker 1996). This may consequently lead to variations in start-up 
time for new businesses. Hence, one important task to facilitate the formation of new ventures is 
to make changes to existing policies which can mitigate the time lag entrepreneurs must bear 
before launching their businesses. However, there is ambiguity surrounding which polices may 
need to be changed. A starting point would be to identify the factors that are potential barriers for 
the venture start-ups in the local economies by extending the waiting time in launching a 
business. Accordingly, an entrepreneur in a country with fewer obstacles is expected to take less 
time to launch a new venture in comparison to an entrepreneur in a country with more obstacles. 
According to the theory of entry regulation (De Soto 1990), the start-up time is the required time 
to create a business after successfully following through with the legal requirements. Instead of 
examining only the legal requirements, we are also focusing on the institutional and non- 
institutional requirements, because these mandatory processes and procedures can extend the 
waiting period to launch new businesses. 
Several institutional and non-institutional factors determine business success (Walker and 
Brown 2004), as well as business formation. Institutional criteria are often considered to be the 
most important criteria to start new ventures (Bruton et al. 2010; Nyström 2008a). Institutional 
theory is concerned with regulative (i.e., legislative issues-laws, regulations, and their 
enforcement, as well as industrial standards), normative (i.e., social and professional), and 
cognitive (i.e., subjectively constructed rules and meanings shaping beliefs and actions) forces 
(Scott 2007). The focus of our study is on the regulative component concerned with the sanctions 
and conformity requirements for venture start-ups, which can influence new venture creation 
time (Bruton et al. 2010). Moreover, the impact of these factors together on firm creation time 
has been under researched. Therefore, a growing interest in the literature is regarding the effects 
of non-institutional factors on firm birth rates. Furthermore, comparing institutional and non-
institutional factors at the time of inception has not been investigated to date. We define macro-
level institutional factors for the purpose of this study as laws, regulations, the enforcement of 
laws and regulations, and industrial standards that must be complied with before launch. In our 
study the factors include: lending interest rates, start-up procedures, domestic credit provided by 
the banking sector, and taxes on income, profits and capital gains. Macro-level non-institutional 
factors for the purpose of this study are the cumulative effect of the institutional factors on 
business launch that can have a negative overall effect, such as GDP per capita, unemployment 
rates, overall education levels of the population that effect the start-up business that they have no 
control over. In our study the factors include: rigidity of employment index, trade (percentage of 
GDP), labor force with tertiary education (percentage of total population), gross domestic 
product per capita (constant 2,000 USD), fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 
people). In summary, it is essential to employ institutional and non- institutional factors to 
comprehensively understand the determinants of firm creation time. 
 
Hypotheses 
Commons (1931) defines institution as a form of collective behavior that achieves the control, 
liberation and expansion of individual action. Institutional factors are not clearly identified and 
defined in the literature. Several studies (e.g. Bruton et al. 2010; Nyström 2008a; De Soto 1990; 
Scott 2007; Highfield and Smiley 1987) draw attention to the importance of institutional factors 
in venture creation and examine factors such as legal procedures, fiscal policies-taxes, monetary 
policies-interest rates, and inflation. Only few studies examine some of the non-institutional 
factors (e.g. political, social, cultural, technological, natural, and personal factors) to explain 
entrepreneurship (e.g. Alam et al. 2011; Minniti and Bygrave 1999; Uhlaner and Thurik 2007). 
For example, Minniti and Bygrave (1999) propose a model of entrepreneurs’ decision processes 
concerning acting on perceived opportunities. The impact of institutional and non-institutional 
factors on entrepreneurship phenomenon has not been investigated comprehensively, giving us 
an opportunity to do so. 
Institutional factors 
Lending interest rates   
New businesses often obtain start-up financing through credit. Based on the money demand 
theory, investors borrow less when the interest rate is high (Ilmakunnas and Topi 1999), which 
can limit the investments into new businesses. Therefore, lending interest rates can be an 
important factor affecting venture creation time. The level of lending interest rates tend to be 
influenced by the business client-banker relationships, bank size, and competitive banks’ choice 
of keeping interest rates low and randomly selecting which applicants get loans (Berger et 
al. 2001; De Meza and Webb 2000). Judicial efficiency in a country can also facilitate lending 
through forcing solvent borrowers to repay when they fail to do so (Jappelli et al. 2005). As a 
result, interest rates tend to vary from market to market (Berger, et al. 2001). 
When lending interest rates are high, they form restrictive borrowing constraints for prospective 
entrepreneurs, leading them to search for and evaluate cost-effective borrowing opportunities. 
Therefore, higher lending interest rates are expected to expand the time required to launch a 
business in a local economy. 
Hypothesis 
1a.  
Lending interest rates are positively associated with new venture creation 
time. 
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector   
Aside from the interest rates, studies suggest that the availability of capital and incentives in the 
markets can be critical institutional factors influencing entrepreneurship (Foster 1986; Kaplan et 
al. 2006; Kashyap and Jeremy 1994). Indeed, external finance tends to be predominantly in the 
form of bank loans (de Meza and Southey 1996). When nascent entrepreneurs have limitations in 
their access to credit, the time period to start up their businesses is expected to be extended 
because of searching and applying for credit. In contrast, when credit is available and easier to 
obtain, this is expected to speed up the venture start-up process. 
Hypothesis 
1b.  
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector is negatively associated with 
new venture creation time. 
Taxation   
Another institutional factor influencing venture creation time is expected to be taxation. On the 
one hand, a stream of research suggests that lower taxation determines firm birth in the economy, 
generating employment opportunities, and fostering investments and economic growth (Brunetti 
et al. 1997; Da Rin et al. 2011; Keusschnigg and Nielsen 2002; a; b; Kitao 2008; Meh 2005; 
Reynolds et al. 2000). According to the traditional market failure arguments, uniform tax 
application to firms of all sizes may result in a high tax burden on small and new businesses 
resulting in market failures. However, according to the taxation proponents, taxation regulates 
the economy and increases the overall social welfare. In addition, while some researchers 
acknowledge the impact of taxation on entrepreneurship, they also suggest the effects are not 
large enough to alter tax policies in favor of entrepreneurs (e.g., Holtz-Eakin2000). Therefore, 
the net effects of taxation on new venture creation are not clear theoretically or empirically 
(Chen et al. 2002; Kitao 2008). 
We expect that higher taxation will be associated with longer venture creation time, lowering 
incentives for entrepreneurial effort through diminished expected capital gains and success. 
Therefore, entrepreneurs with taxation concerns are expected to take a longer time to prepare and 
plan for venture start-up. 
Hypothesis 
1c.  
Taxation on income, profits, and capital gains will be positively associated 
with new venture creation time. 
Procedures to register a business   
As Nyström (2008b) suggests, availability, flexibility and usability of institutions can vary at the 
local, regional or national levels and can influence existing or new firms directly or indirectly. In 
particular, regulations for entry of a new firm include a number of procedures, official time, and 
official cost (Djankov et al. 2002). Both Pigou’s (1938) Public Interest Theory and Stigler’s 
(1971) Public Choice Theory explain how government involvement can change market 
outcomes. Public Interest Theory predicts that to achieve better outcomes, government needs to 
tighten the entry requirements through implementing and enforcing several bureaucratic 
procedures. In contrast, Public Choice Theory explains how government can decrease social 
welfare by creating entry barriers and reducing competition in the market. Accordingly, 
governments need to remove entry barriers by reducing unnecessary procedures (Bruton et 
al. 2010). 
According to Bruton et al. (2010), entrepreneurs may be discouraged from starting new ventures 
in the following extreme cases: when there is no formal institutional structure which may imply 
lack of stability and security; and when there are an excessive number of rules and regulations 
and required documentation and reporting delaying the venture start-up. Studies generally 
suggest a negative relationship between the time devoted to start-up procedures and 
entrepreneurship (Djankov 2009; Djankov et al. 2002; Dreher and Gassebner 2007; Kaplan et 
al. 2006; Klapper et al. 2009). A recent study by Bruhn (2011) also shows that a decrease in the 
number of registration procedures elevated the number of registered businesses in Mexico. 
Hence, higher number of start-up procedures is expected to increase new venture creation time 
since each procedure requires time and entrepreneurs’ continuing effort. 
Hypothesis 
1d.  
Start-up procedures to register a business will be positively associated with 
new venture creation time. 
Inflation   
Inflation is another non-institutional factor which may influence venture start-up time. Research 
generally associates lower inflation rates with an increased rate of new ventures (e.g. Highfield 
and Smiley 1987; Brunetti et al. 1997). Indeed, a high inflation rate can interfere with the ability 
of the financial sector to allocate resources effectively to prospective entrepreneurs (Boyd et 
al. 2001; Rousseau and Wachtel 2002; Smith and Van Egteren 2005). Financial intermediation 
tends to become difficult since the flow of information concerning investment projects and 
returns becomes more uncertain and less readily available. Both the entrepreneurs and financiers 
may be more analytical when faced with an entrepreneurial opportunity owing to the 
uncertainties concerning future prices, interest rates, and exchange rates deriving from higher 
levels of inflation (Rousseau and Wachtel 2002), which may result in extended start up time. 
Hypothesis 1e.  Inflation will be positively associated with new venture creation time. 
Non-institutional factors 
Aside from the institutional factors, it is important to identify the non-institutional factors 
representing the state of the economy, such as trade, rigidity of employment index, GDP per 
capita, and education level of workforce, that may affect venture creation time. 
Trade   
Studies suggest a positive relationship between import and/or export trading and economic 
growth through an increase in per-capita income, which can facilitate firm entry; (Cieślik et 
al. 2010, 2012; Freund and Bolaky 2008; Hausmann et al. 2007; Holmes and Schmitz 2001). We 
expect that increased income through trade can diminish the need to obtain financing and 
consequently speed up the venture start-up process. Potential earnings facilitated by trade can 
also encourage nascent entrepreneurs to start up their ventures sooner. Moreover, trade can 
elevate demand through increased purchasing power, necessitating more supplies through new 
businesses. Therefore, trade is expected to be negatively associated with new venture creation 
time. 
Hypothesis 2a.  Trade will be negatively associated with new venture creation time. 
Rigidity of employment index   
Rigid employment regulations can constitute barriers for entrepreneurship (Brunetti et al. 1997; 
Djankov and Ramalho 2009; Henreksen et al. 2010; Kanniainen and Vesala 2005; Robson 2003; 
Nyström 2008b). Studies draw attention to differences in labor protection laws around the world 
as well (e.g., Djankov and Ramalho 2009). However, we do not know enough about the impact 
of rigidity of labor laws on entrepreneurship. We expect that strict labor protection may prolong 
the time to launch a business by restricting entrepreneurs’ ability to hire or result in hiring 
delays. 
Additionally, employed nascent entrepreneurs who may be content with labor protection rights 
also may not have enough incentives to start up their own businesses owing to the higher 
opportunity cost of being self-employed and greater risk. Within the framework of 
entrepreneurship literature, a potential entrepreneur is expected to compare the opportunity cost 
of being self-employed with the expected entrepreneurial benefits when he/she identifies an 
entrepreneurial opportunity (Johnson 1986; Morales-Gualdrón and Roig 2005; Shane and 
Venkataraman 2000; Venkataraman 1997). The entrepreneur chooses to exploit entrepreneurial 
opportunities only if he/she perceives that the entrepreneurial benefit will exceed the opportunity 
cost of entrepreneurial activity (Amit et al. 1995; Gifford 1992; Hamilton 1989; Hamilton and 
Harper 1994; Reynolds et al. 1995; Reynolds et al. 1994; Shane 2003). When a potential 
entrepreneur has no existing job, hence no labor protection to lose, then the opportunity cost of 
entrepreneurship is relatively low. This can increase the likelihood of engaging in 
entrepreneurship (Storey 1991). Within the context of rigid labor laws protecting employees, the 
employed prospective entrepreneur is expected to be more analytical or even skeptical about 
starting a business. These are expected to extend the time to start up their businesses. 
Hypothesis 
2b.  
Rigidity of labor laws will be positively associated with new venture 
creation time. 
GDP per capita   
Entries of new firms tend to increase during periods of economic growth (i.e., “pull” hypothesis) 
and decrease during a recession (i.e., “push” hypothesis) (Ilmakunnas and Topi 1999). The 
growth of gross domestic product (GDP) is usually significant during economic expansion, 
which encourages new firms to enter into the market and also reduces the number of existing 
firms exiting the market (Klapper et al. 2009). In contrast, Ilmakunnas and Topi (1999) argue 
that during an economic downturn self-employment through opening a new business can be an 
appealing option. Moreover, creating a new business may be less complicated because hiring 
labor, renting capital (buildings), and getting loans may become easier. However, there is not 
enough evidence to support these hypotheses consistently, which gives us an opportunity to 
revisit this relationship in this paper. Since an entrepreneur’s higher levels of wealth through 
increased GDP per capita can mitigate the entrepreneur’s lending or borrowing and consequently 
minimize the search for funds, we expect a negative association between GDP per capital and 
new venture creation time. 
Hypothesis 
2c.  
GDP per capita will be negatively associated with new venture creation 
time. 
Education   
Studies within the framework of the theory of endogenous growth suggest a significant link 
between human capital and economic growth (e.g., Boucekkine et al. 2002; Castello and 
Domenech 2002). Scholars are divided in regards to the direction of the relationship between 
education level of the labor force and entrepreneurship. On the one hand, a stream of research 
suggests a positive relationship between education and entrepreneurship since education can 
promote productivity and creativity (Carter and Collinson 1999; Davidsson and Honig 2003; 
Dulleck et al. 2006; Ozturk 2001; Reynolds et al. 2000). Consistent with the economics scholars’ 
view, entrepreneurship scholars Minniti and Bygrave (1999) argue that subjective initial 
endowment of the entrepreneur is equally important as institutional and economic circumstances 
in an economy for entrepreneurship to occur. Knowledge is a personal human capital endowment 
(Alvarez and Barney 2004; Chang et al. 2009; Nonaka 1994). Mojica et al. (2009) argue that 
entrepreneurship is one channel by which knowledge transfers into growth. Gaygisiz and Köksal 
(2003) show how an individual’s education level relates to firm formation. Indeed, entrepreneurs 
obtain knowledge through education as well as work experiences and entrepreneurial activities 
existing within their communities (Chang et al. 2009; Minniti and Bygrave 1999; Shane and 
Venkataraman 2000). Link and Welsh (2012) looked at the MIT top 40 young investors starting 
businesses based on their creative achievements and found no empirical support for age, 
education and gender to start a new business. Rather, they found entrepreneurial experience as a 
major influence on them launching a new business. Obviously, the education levels of those 
named in the MIT top 40 would probably be near the top of the education level worldwide and 
would be different for most developed or emerging countries’ average entrepreneur. 
Additionally, a workforce lacking education can result in scarcity of skilled workers, preventing 
or delaying a venture start-up (Begley et al. 2005). 
On the other hand, some of the researchers suggest a negative link between education and 
entrepreneurship since individuals with higher education can perceive higher social status when 
employed by others (Evans 1989; Uhlaner and Thurik 2007). In addition to these polar views, a 
recent study by Poschke (2008) shows a U-shaped relationship between education and 
entrepreneurship, where lower and higher levels of education can lead to entrepreneurship. Since 
we expect that education can lower the time to search for knowledge and information in regards 
to business start-up, we expect a negative relationship between education and venture creation 
time. 
Hypothesis 2d.  Education will be negatively associated with new venture creation time. 
In the following sections, we present the methods and the results of our analyses. Then, we 
conclude with a discussion of results and implications for future research and policy. 
 
Methodology 
Data 
Research in international businesses has been challenging owing to the data that are not readily 
available. In our study, data are collected from the World Bank Indicators (2008), which is one 
of the largest data sources for the international studies. We analyzed 15 emerging as well as 
developed European countries from 2003 to 2006 after dropping observations with missing 
values. The developing economies include Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia. The developed countries include Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Sweden, and United Kingdom. This sample is representative of the population of 
European economies since it includes both emerging and developed economies. There is no 
intention to use neither these countries nor the specified time periods. Therefore, employed 
countries and time periods or even variables are what we received in complete form from the 
WBI 2008. 
Variables 
Dependent variable   
We have used the new venture creation time as the dependent variable in our empirical model. 
This variable measures the time that is required for an entrepreneur to start up a business. On 
average, it takes about 28 days to form a new business, but the range varies from 7 days to 
72 days. 
Independent variables   
We included several institutional and non-institutional determinants to understand the firm 
formation in a country. The institutional factors include lending interest rates, start-up 
procedures, domestic credit provided by the banking sector, and taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains. 
In general, private or commercial banks provide loans to prime customers and the interest rate 
they charge on loans is called lending interest rates. The average lending interest rate is 6.06 % 
and ranges from 2.56 to 12.82 %. The following institutional variable is the start-up procedures 
to register a business. This variable shows how many legal steps, such as getting necessary 
permits or licenses, completing all inscriptions and verifications, and notifications that are 
required to start a business. As expected, this varies from country to country and ranges 
anywhere from 3 to 11 steps that are required, with a mean of 7 steps in this sample. The third 
institutional variable isdomestic credit provided by the banking sector which means that the 
banking sector (i.e., monetary authorities and deposit money banks, savings and mortgage loan 
institutions) provide credit to various sectors on a gross basis. This variable is collected as a 
percentage of GDP and the domestic banking sector provides 89 % of loans to the borrowers. 
The last employed institutional variable is taxes on income, profits, and capital gains. This 
variable is measured as the total amount of taxes payable by businesses as a percentage of total 
revenue and collected as a percentage of GDP. The mean percentage of taxes is almost 22 %, and 
the range varies from 5 to 38 % on average. The last macro-institutional independent variable 
is inflation (annual percentage). It is measured by the consumer price index which reflects 
consumer buying power over a fixed period of time for a specific or fixed basket of goods and 
services. Inflation is frequently used to manage cash flow in the economy. For example, this 
includes pensions, Medicare, and adjustments to insurance policies, among other adjustments. As 
a result, most investors will find that inflation affects them personally in different ways, and 
hence, business formation and investment are highly correlated. Thus, volatile inflation rates can 
influence the time to form a business. The mean inflation in the dataset is 2.83 %. 
The non-institutional independent variables include rigidity of employment index, trade 
(percentage of GDP), labor force with tertiary education (percentage of total population), gross 
domestic product per capita (constant 2,000 USD), fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 
1,000 people). World Bank developed an index to measure rigidity of employment. This index 
measures the regulation of employment in terms of hiring and firing of workers and the rigidity 
of working hours and it ranges from 0 to 100, with 0 being least rigid regulations and 100 being 
most rigid regulations. In our data set, it varies from 13 to 62 with the mean of 42, which 
indicates there are some countries where it is very hard to get employed and at the same time it is 
very easy to get fired. Labor force with a tertiary education (percentage of total labor force) 
variable is included to represent the skill and education level of the labor force in each country. It 
is measured as the percentage of the country’s labor force population that has at least a tertiary 
education (i.e., all post-secondary education including but not limited to universities). Using this 
variable instead of total population is more reasonable because in natural circumstances, the 
labor force population (15 to 64 years) is usually the group of individuals who are interested in 
forming new businesses. Therefore, education of this group matters in terms of business 
formation, as higher education level fosters entrepreneurial growth. On average, 25 % people in 
the labor force have a tertiary education, but in some countries only 12 % of the labor force is 
tertiary educated, while in other countries almost 41 % of the labor force is tertiary educated. 
We also investigated gross domestic product per capita (constant 2,000 USD), which indicates a 
country’s economic well-being. Each country tends to differ substantially in terms of their 
economic status. This variable is measured as gross domestic product divided by the midyear 
population. This variable provides information about economic performance over time. 
However, the well-being of the population also depends on other factors. For example, these 
include leisure time, environmental quality, crime rate, or health. Nevertheless, these variables 
are not readily available to the public. The mean gross domestic product per capita is 16,563 
dollars per person and it ranges from 1,839 dollars to 31,178 dollars per person. Hence, there is a 
high level of variation among the employed countries in terms of their well-being (GDP per 
capita). 
Another non-institutional variable we examined is trade. The World Bank defines this variable 
as the net value of imports and exports of goods and services of a country from the rest of the 
world as a percentage of GDP. The mean trade for this sample is 112.44 %. 
Control variables 
Phone subscribers   
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people) is used to identify the country’s 
infrastructure. This variable is measured as the total number of fixed and mobile phone line 
subscribers. This indicator of infrastructure allows evaluation of how solid the technological base 
for a country is and how it influences business operations. Since the infrastructure of a country 
indicates an entrepreneurship friendly environment (Abetti 2004; Begley et al.2005; Brunetti et 
al. 1997), which can influence venture creation time, we control for this variable. On average, 
around 133 people subscribe to either a fixed or mobile telephone line. 
Female participation in the labor force   
The female labor force participation is an indicator of a country’s progressiveness. It is measured 
as the percentage of females in the labor force. In recent times, women have increasingly 
participated in the labor force, which has been driving employment trends and minimizing the 
gender gap in the workplace. Moreover, research suggests that women’s labor force participation 
rates is positively associated with business formation, hence economic growth (Delmar and 
Davidsson 2000; Minniti and Arenius 2003; Reynolds et al. 2000; Verheul and Thurik 2001; 
Verheul et al. 2006). Since female participation in the workforce indicates the availability of 
workforce and can influence venture start-up time, we control for this variable. The women’s 
participation rate is 45 % in this dataset. 
Proportion of population ages 15–64   
This variable is measured using the population ages from 15 to 64 as a percentage of the total 
population, which indicates the availability of the workforce and hence can influence venture 
creation time (Reynolds et al. 2000). On average, 67 % of the laborers fall between 15 and 
64 years of age, but the range varies from 65 % to 71 %. 
More information about these variables and the World Bank Indicators (2008) dataset is 
available at http://data.worldbank.org/topic/labor-and-social-protection. 
Methodology 
The econometric model is specified after performing several tests. The Breusch-Pagan test is 
performed to confirm the right estimation technique and then the Hausman test is employed to 
choose the correct model between random effects and fixed effects. A panel fixed effects 
estimation procedure is followed to investigate the hypotheses in this paper. The time required to 
open a business in a country is employed as the dependent variable and the explanatory variables 
include lending interest rates, start-up procedures, rigidity in the employment index (i.e., 
regulation of employment), domestic credit provided by the banking sector, trade, taxes, 
inflation, labor force with tertiary education, GDP per capita, female laborers, and average 
population age. 
 
Results 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 presents the regression results with the required times to form a business as the 
dependent variable. One of the purposes of this paper is to make a comparison between the 
institutional and non-institutional factors to form businesses or entry rates. First, we will discuss 
the macro-institutional factors and then the discussion of macro-non-institutional factors in the 
following section. 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics: the determinants of venture start-up time 
Variable/Stat
istics 
Time 
require
d to 
start a 
busines
s 
(days) 
Lendi
ng 
intere
st 
rate 
(%) 
Start-
up 
proced
ures to 
register 
a 
busines
s 
(numbe
r) 
Rigidity 
of 
employ
ment 
index 
(0 = less 
rigid, 
100 = mo
re rigid) 
Domesti
c credit 
provide
d by 
banking 
sector 
(% of 
gdp) 
Trade 
(% of 
GDP) 
Taxes 
on 
income
, 
profits, 
and 
capital 
gains 
(% of 
revenu
e) 
Inflati
on 
(Annu
al %) 
Labor 
force 
with 
tertiary 
educatio
n (% of 
total 
populati
on) 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2000 US$) 
Fixed 
line and 
mobile 
phone 
subscrib
ers (per 
1000 
people) 
Labor 
force, 
female 
(% of 
total 
labor 
force) 
Populat
ion 
ages 
15–64 
(% of 
total) 
Mean 28.27 6.06 7.01 42.06 89.31 
112.4
4 
21.8
5 2.82 24.87 
16,563.
37 
133.0
2 
45.1
5 67.86 
Standard 
Deviatio
n 
2.32 2.09 2.32 13.82 46.57 38.67 9.82 1.75 7.63 10,523.90 22.81 2.49 1.82 
Minimu
m 3 2.56 3 13 23.24 48.55 5.14 
−1.1
8 12.5 
1,839.7
6 77.74 
38.4
5 65 
Maximu
m 72 
12.8
2 11 62 
186.6
8 
172.7
7 
38.5
6 7.26 41.79 
31,178.
09 
170.5
3 
49.0
9 71 
Count 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Mean 36.6 7.14 8.03 45.94 51.80 123.9 15.9 3.45 21.68 8849.0 120.9 21.6 69.24 
Variable/Stat
istics 
Time 
require
d to 
start a 
busines
s 
(days) 
Lendi
ng 
intere
st 
rate 
(%) 
Start-
up 
proced
ures to 
register 
a 
busines
s 
(numbe
r) 
Rigidity 
of 
employ
ment 
index 
(0 = less 
rigid, 
100 = mo
re rigid) 
Domesti
c credit 
provide
d by 
banking 
sector 
(% of 
gdp) 
Trade 
(% of 
GDP) 
Taxes 
on 
income
, 
profits, 
and 
capital 
gains 
(% of 
revenu
e) 
Inflati
on 
(Annu
al %) 
Labor 
force 
with 
tertiary 
educatio
n (% of 
total 
populati
on) 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2000 US$) 
Fixed 
line and 
mobile 
phone 
subscrib
ers (per 
1000 
people) 
Labor 
force, 
female 
(% of 
total 
labor 
force) 
Populat
ion 
ages 
15–64 
(% of 
total) 
6 
(18.8
6) 
(4.8
4) 
(5.86
) 
(37.6
4) 
(132.
20) 
8 
(99.2
6) 
0 
(28.6
6) 
(2.1
1) 
(28.5
2) 
0 
(25379.
79) 
6 
(146.
80) 
8 
(28.5
2) 
(66.2
9) 
Standard 
Deviatio
n 
14.5
7 
(11.2
6) 
1.86 
(1.6
4) 
2.07 
(2.07
) 
12.22 
(14.4
4) 
15.54 
(29.8
1) 
25.77 
(46.5
6) 
3.79 
(10.2
2) 
2.10 
(0.8
2) 
5.44 
(8.22
) 
8284.1
3 
(3475.7
2) 
22.74 
(13.1
7) 
5.44 
(8.22
) 
1.12 
(1.05
) 
Minimu
m 
16.0
0 
(7.00
) 
4.93 
(2.5
7) 
5.00 
(3.00
) 
20.00 
(13.0
0) 
23.24 
(102.
54) 
69.27 
(48.5
6) 
10.7
2 
(5.14
) 
−1.1
8 
(0.3
7) 
13.20 
(12.5
0) 
1839.7
6 
(19379.
54) 
77.74 
(125.
70) 
13.2
0 
(12.5
0) 
67.14 
(65.0
1) 
Maximu
m 
72.0
0 
(56.0
0) 
12.8
2 
(7.4
9) 
11.00 
(9.00
) 
88.96 
(56.0
0) 
88.96 
(186.
68) 
169.3
5 
(172.
77) 
23.7
4 
(38.5
7) 
7.26 
(3.9
4) 
33.50 
(41.8
0) 
30736.
06 
(31178.
10) 
163.9
4 
(125.
90) 
33.5
0 
(41.8
0) 
71.20 
(68.1
6) 
Count 32 (28) 
32 
(28) 
32 
(28) 
32 
(28) 
32 
(28) 
32 
(28) 
32 
(28) 
32 
(28) 
32 
(28) 32 (28) 
32 
(28) 
32 
(28) 
32 
(28) 
 
 
Table 2 Correlation statistics 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. LR 1.00   
  
  
  
  
  
    
          
2. START-UP 0.38 1.00 
3. TIMEBUSI 0.57 0.30 1.00 
4. EMPLYINDEX 0.20 0.15 0.09 1.00 
5. 
DCREDITBANK −0.64 −0.53 −0.54 −0.33 1.00 
6. PERTTRADE 0.05 −0.19 0.46 −0.07 −0.16 
7. PERTLFFEML 0.13 −0.11 0.18 0.32 −0.42 1.00 
8. PERTURBAN −0.26 −0.40 −0.36 −0.50 0.48 −0.10 1.00 
9. PERTTAXES −0.38 −0.18 −0.27 −0.53 0.61 −0.65 0.35 0.52 1.00 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
10. INFLATION 0.48 0.01 0.19 0.19 −0.21 0.12 −0.27 −0.47 −0.18 1.00 
11. 
LABORTEEDU −0.45 −0.65 −0.14 −0.24 0.50 0.10 0.34 0.20 0.40 −0.07 1.00 
12. POPUAGE 0.33 0.54 0.49 0.08 −0.60 0.18 −0.69 −0.57 −0.42 0.33 −0.46 1.00 
13. GDPPCAPITA −0.53 −0.69 −0.60 −0.12 0.79 −0.27 0.45 0.63 0.41 −0.12 0.43 −0.63 1.00 
14. TELEPHONE −0.47 −0.37 −0.28 −0.27 0.62 −0.29 0.33 0.59 0.40 −0.12 0.27 −0.40 0.41 1.00 
Table 3 Results: the determinants of venture start-up time 
Dependent variable 
Control Pooled model 
Developing 
countries 
Developed 
countries Time required to start a 
business 
Explanatory variables 
Constant −126.59 (132.17) 
−604.72 
(659.14) 
−788.71 
(1009.62) 
−1101.62 
(1394.76) 
Fixed line and mobile phone 
subscribers 
−0.17** 
(0.07) −0.08 (0.16) −0.44 (0.30) −0.06 (0.33) 
Female participation in the 
labor force −1.23 (1.37) −3.92 (3.64) 1.59 (6.39) 4.55 (11.28) 
Proportion of population ages 
15–64 years 
3.43* (1.88) 
12.78 (9.37) 10.87 (13.20) 13.77 (20.22) 
Lending interest rate 3.04* (1.59) −0.44 (2.51) 3.77 (2.79) 
Start-up procedures to register 
a business 
6.42*** 
(1.99) 11.47*** (2.67) −0.34 (5.90) 
Rigidity of employment index 0.33 (0.49) 1.19 (0.80) 0.56 (0.99) 
Domestic credit provided by 
banking sector 0.33 (0.22) −0.12 (0.36) 0.49 (0.72) 
Trade 0.15 (0.19) 1.04** (0.45) −0.14 (0.37) 
Taxes on income, profits, and 
capital gains 2.01** (0.86) −1.68 (1.84) 2.72 (1.60) 
Inflation −0.93 (1.29) 1.82 (2.60) −1.25 (2.06) 
Labor force with tertiary 
education −1.18 (1.16) −0.15 (2.47) −0.41 (1.82) 
GDP per capita −0.01** (0.00) −0.00 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01) 
Log-likelihood −244.57 −173.43 −65.48 −92.94 
N 60 60 28 32 
Please note standard errors are in the parenthesis. Asterisks (*, **, ***) denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % 
level, respectively 
In the first model, we ran the analyses with control variables. Fixed line and mobile phone 
subscription and proportion of population ages 15–64 are significant. Log likelihood function is 
−244.57. In the second pooled model, we ran the analyses with controls and independent 
variables. The log likelihood function has improved from −244.57 to −173.43 in the pooled 
model. The first significant variable in this model is lending interest rates. This variable is 
significant at the 5 % level and relates positively to the dependent variable. That is, if the lending 
interest rate is higher, then the required time to form a business automatically increases, while 
keeping all other variables in the model constant. Thus, when there is a higher lending interest 
rate, entrepreneurs will tend to borrow less. Owing to the lack of interest in investment in new or 
ongoing ventures, it will take more time to form a firm. 
The new firm entry rates also depend upon the start-up procedures to register a business. This 
relationship is positive and significant at the 1 % level, which means that entry barriers 
significantly increase the start-up time to form a business. The start-up procedure has a clear 
positive connection to the firm creation time. Hence, while keeping other variables at constant, 
increasing the number of steps to open a business will increase the required time. 
The last significant relationship involves the tax rate macro-institutional variable. This variable 
enters positively into the equation, which means that increasing tax rates diminishes the interest 
of the entrepreneurs to form a business. Our results suggest that a high tax rate is associated with 
a low firm formation rate since it increases the required time for a firm to enter into the market. 
The higher tax rate on firm’s revenue forms a significant blockage in firm formation. 
The GDP per capita is the only significant variable among the macro-non-institutional variables 
in this paper. A negative relationship seems to exist between the required time to form a firm and 
GDP per capita, which is in the predicted direction. This means that an increase of GDP per 
capita will reduce the required time to create a new firm, while holding all other variables in the 
model constant. This also suggests that a higher standard of living or greater national income is 
related to the number of days it takes for a firm to enter the marketplace. 
The rest of the explanatory variables are insignificant. Our model predicts that macro-
institutional factors that include lending interest rates, the number of procedures, tax rates, and 
only GDP per capita among macro-non-institutional variables are significant determinants, have 
critical roles in new venture formation in the European markets. 
For robustness, we ran the model for emerging economies. The results of this model are reported 
in column (2) in Table 3. The start-up procedures and trade variables are significant factors. We 
ran the same empirical model for developed economies and the results can be seen in column (3) 
in Table 3. The significant variables in this model are lending interest rate and labor force with a 
tertiary education. 
Variance inflation factors (VIF) are calculated and did not indicate any multi-collinearity 
problem in the dataset since the VIFs did not exceed 10. The Durban-Watson test is performed to 
check the serial autocorrelation and the results did not indicate the presence of serial 
autocorrelation in the dataset. The regressions in this table are estimated using fixed effects 
estimation technique and we used Wald test to test for heteroskedasticity. Wald test results 
indicated no issues associated with heteroskedasticity. 
Robustness checks 
To examine the robustness of the results from the panel model, we also run an OLS (Ordinary 
Least Square) regression model while keeping the same dependent and independent variables 
(Table 4). The first OLS model includes control variables and only population age variable 
becomes significant with an expected sign. In the second OLS model, we include all independent 
variables along with the control variables which are very similar to the pooled panel model. OLS 
model 2 (Adj-R-Squared is 53 %) gained a significant amount of explanation power from OLS 
model 1 (Adj-R-Squared is 21 %). Moreover, the results from this model are not substantially 
different from the pooled panel model. The lending interest rates and start-up procedures 
variables are significant in this model with their expected signs as we find in the panel model. 
Other than that, inflation which is another institutional variable also becomes significant in this 
model and having an expected sign. Therefore, institutional factors are major players in the 
venture creation at least in European countries. Henceforth, the overall conclusions remain 
unchanged regardless of the estimation methodologies. 
Table 4 Results from the ordinary least square model: the determinants of venture start-up time 
Dependent variable Control Pooled model 
Time required to start a business 
Explanatory Variables 
Constant −247.94*** (85.68) −270.90** (125.89) 
Fixed line and mobile phone subscribers −0.05 (0.09) 0.14 (0.09) 
Female participation in the labor force 0.49 (0.76) 0.07 (0.96) 
Proportion of population ages 15–64 years 
3.84*** (1.09) 
3.38** (1.63) 
Lending interest rate 5.19*** (1.19) 
Start-up procedures to register a business −0.25 (1.38) 
Rigidity of employment index 0.15 (0.14) 
Domestic credit provided by banking sector −0.01 (0.07) 
Trade 0.08 (0.07) 
Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains 0.16 (0.28) 
Inflation −2.82** (1.14) 
Labor force with tertiary education 0.52 (0.39) 
GDP per capita −0.00 (0.00) 
Dependent variable Control Pooled model 
R- Squared 0.25 0.63 
Adj-R-Squared 0.21 0.54 
N 60 60 
Please note standard errors are in the parenthesis. Asterisks (*, **, ***) denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % 
level, respectively 
In a separate robustness check we redefined our dependent variable and we used venture creation 
time per start-up procedure and venture creation time multiplied by number of start-up 
procedures instead of just venture creation time. The modified dependent variables add more 
variations to the model. Table 5 reports the results. We ran fixed effects and OLS models with 
these modified dependent variables. Results from these models are quite similar to the prior 
models. Therefore, the conclusions of the paper remain the same regardless of the methodologies 
of estimations or dependent variable specifications.1 
Table 5 Robust check results from fixed effects and ordinary least square model: the determinants of venture 
creation time 
Dependent 
variable 
Fixed effects 
model OLS model 
Fixed effects 
model OLS model 
Time required to 
start a business 
by number of 
start-up 
procedures 
Time required to 
start a business 
by number of 
start-up 
procedures 
Time required to 
start a business 
multiply number 
of procedures 
Time required to 
start a business 
multiply number 
of procedures 
Explanatory variables 
Constant −175.87* (102.12) −9.28 (9.84) −7582.64 (4696.41) 
−1060.12** 
(495.13) 
Fixed line and 
mobile phone 
subscribers 
0.01 (0.03) 0.02*** (0.00) 1.02 (1.27) 0.62* (0.33) 
Female 
participation in 
the labor force 
0.72 (0.71) −0.18*** (0.07) 23.75 (32.73) −3.26 (4.09) 
Proportion of 
population ages 
15–64 years 
2.23 (1.39) 0.31** (0.13) 83.46 (64.18) 15.71*** (5.68) 
Lending interest 
rate 0.52** (0.24) 0.59*** (0.10) 27.46** (11.13) 22.93*** (6.96) 
Start-up 
procedures to 
register a 
business 
0.19 (0.30) −0.78*** (0.13) 74.46*** (13.93) 20.80*** (5.36) 
Dependent 
variable 
Fixed effects 
model OLS model 
Fixed effects 
model OLS model 
Time required to 
start a business 
by number of 
start-up 
procedures 
Time required to 
start a business 
by number of 
start-up 
procedures 
Time required to 
start a business 
multiply number 
of procedures 
Time required to 
start a business 
multiply number 
of procedures 
Rigidity of 
employment 
index 
0.01 (0.09) 0.00 (0.01) −0.22 (3.91) −0.54 (0.66) 
Domestic credit 
provided by 
banking sector 
0.02 (0.03) −0.01** (0.01) 2.37 (1.55) −0.34 (0.35) 
Trade 0.09** (0.04) 0.01 (0.00) 4.64** (1.89) 0.19 (0.29) 
Taxes on 
income, profits, 
and capital 
gains 
0.43*** (0.13) −0.01 (0.02) 17.80*** (6.18) −1.48 (0.98) 
Inflation −0.21 (0.20) −0.32*** (0.08) −14.17 (9.23) −10.42** (4.20) 
Labor force 
with tertiary 
education 
−0.28 (0.26) 0.09*** (0.02) −6.71 (12.05) 3.82* (1.91) 
GDP per capita 
−0.00 (0.00) 
−0.00** (0.00) 
−0.04 (0.04) 
−0.00 (0.00) 
R- Squared 0.91 0.97 
Adj-R-Squared 0.89 0.97 
Log-likelihood −55.99   −285.70   
N 60 60 60 60 
Please note standard errors are in the parenthesis. Asterisks (*, **, ***) denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 % 
level, respectively 
 
Discussion and implications 
European countries have gone through several transitions in the past two decades and have had 
several macroeconomic policy adjustments during this time. These macro-institutional or macro-
non-institutional policies affect entrepreneurship either directly or indirectly. Since 
entrepreneurship is the key to economic growth around the world, the main objectives of this 
study are to identify the factors that block or delay firm formation through prolonging venture 
start-up time. To do so, we examine 4 years (2003–2006) of data for 15 European emerging and 
developed countries. Venture creation time is regressed on several macroeconomic institutional 
or non-institutional variables. Fixed effects modeling is used to investigate the factors 
influencing new firm formation. 
The results of panel data analysis suggest that the institutional factors such as lending interest 
rates, the number of start-up procedures, and taxation as well as the non-institutional factors like 
GDP per capita are the major factors which prolong the new venture creation time in Europe. 
The institutional factors can discourage many prospective entrepreneurs from actually starting up 
their businesses and restrict firm births in these countries. The non-institutional factors, except 
GDP per capita, are not found to be influential on venture creation time. Higher levels of GDP 
per capita lead to shorter venture start-up time since personal wealth of entrepreneurs may lower 
the need for external funding or the amount of external. Public policy makers in emerging and 
developed countries would be wise to examine their current policies and what can be reasonably 
be revised to encourage new venture development. New venture tax credits, for example, could 
be used to offset some of the negative non-institutional factors that policymakers have less 
control over in the short run. 
Although not hypothesized, the findings for the emerging countries are interestingly different 
from the findings for developed countries when we compare them. Institutional factors such as 
start-up procedures and trade opportunities are important determinants of new venture creation 
time in emerging countries, consistent with the findings of recent studies (i.e., Cieślik et 
al. 2010, 2012; Demetriades and Fielding 2009; Anayiotos and Toroyan 2009). Hence, changing 
the institutional environment by reducing the bureaucratic procedures to register a business can 
lower the venture creation time, encouraging nascent entrepreneurs to start up their businesses in 
developing countries. However, trade affects venture creation time positively in developing 
countries. This may be because of the requirements for additional procedures owing to the 
existence of importing and exporting activities. Furthermore, importing and exporting activities 
may elevate quality expectations, which can extend nascent entrepreneurs’ preparation time 
before the actual start-up. Hence, European policy makers may generally need to minimize 
bureaucratic procedures to register a business. In addition, policymakers would be wise to 
increase assistance for small and medium businesses in the trade arena, including import and 
export assistance, identifying trade partners, lowering barriers to entry, and providing tax 
incentives. In developed economies, however, both institutional and non-institutional factors do 
not seem to influence venture creation time. In developed countries, individual factors may be 
more influential than institutional and environmental factors on venture start-up time. Future 
studies could examine the potential individual factors that may affect venture start-up time across 
countries since investigation of other countries was beyond the scope of our study owing to the 
lack of data regarding countries outside Europe. For example, a recent study by Chang and 
colleagues (2009) identifies family support as an important individual factor which can 
positively influence both venture preparation and actual start-up among Hispanic entrepreneurs 
in New England in the United States. 
Future research can also investigate the outcomes of venture start up time. A better 
understanding of how venture start up time affects venture success or failure is also important in 
policy making. A relatively shorter venture creation time may encourage entrepreneurs to 
actually start up their businesses. However, we do not know enough about whether this can lead 
entrepreneurs to new venture success or failure. Therefore, future research could examine the 
outcomes of shorter versus longer new venture creation time. Countries with a shorter start-up 
time would be wise to publicize this in the press for widespread dissemination that may have the 
effect of encouraging more venture launches. This research needs to include longitudinal studies 
that examine what policies have the most impact on sustaining these start-up businesses. 
In conclusion, our study has analyzed the effects of national level characteristics such as macro-
institutional or macro-non-institutional factors on new firm creation. Our findings support our 
main argument that macro-institutional factors have much more influence than macro-non-
institutional factors. Overall, venture creation time is associated with institutional factors (i.e. 
interest rates, start-up procedures to register a business, and tax rate) and GDP per capita as the 
non-institutional factor. The findings suggest that nations need to revise their institutional 
policies to foster entrepreneurship and dynamic economic growth, since institutions can both 
constrain and enable entrepreneurship (Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003; Scott 2007; Bruton et 
al. 2010). The findings of our study can inform policy-makers concerning the need for an 
entrepreneur-friendly environment by reducing the lending interest rates, minimizing and 
overseeing the bureaucratic procedures to start businesses, and lowering the tax rates, which may 
encourage new ventures to form through lowering the venture start-up time, and ultimately 
leading to greater economic growth. 
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Footnotes 
1 Probably the time series model (duration model or unit root) may be warrant to use to estimate 
such type of data, but unfortunately, we have only 4 years data which is less than the desire 
number of years that we need to require develop a time series model. 
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